



Secure Multimedia Processing over Cloud

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Winnipeg

UWINNIPEG
THE HEART OF THE CITY,
the heart of the continent



THE UNIVERSITY OF WINNIPEG





Winnipeg Summer






Winnipeg Winter





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Cloud-based Multimedia Computing


- Very popular these days
- Companies Offering 2D Imaging
 - AT&T, Dell, Intel etc.
- Companies Offering 3D Imaging
 - Microsoft, KDDI, Sinha Systems etc.



Image source:


<http://www.ms imaging.com/Content/themes/MSI/images/cloud-based-software-image-silo-cloud-file.jpg>

Cloud-based Multimedia Storage and Processing




2D Image Visualization

Cloud-based Multimedia Storage and Processing



3D Image Visualization

Cloud-based Multimedia Storage and Processing



Surveillance Video Quality Enhancement

Cloud-based Multimedia Storage and Processing




Image Zooming and Cropping

Security and Privacy Challenges in Cloud-based Storage and Processing


- How many of you mind if your medical image is available to an adversary?
- What can an adversary do with an image?



Image source: <http://greenberg-art.com/.Toons/Toons,%20social/qqxsgMedical%20privacy.gif>


Rest of the talk

- Introduction and Motivation
- **Addressing the Challenges**
 - Finding a Cryptosystem
 - Using Real Numbers in a Cryptosystem
- Three Frameworks
 - Secure Cloud-based Image Scaling/Cropping
 - Secure Cloud-based Pre-classification Volume Ray-casting
 - Secure Cloud-based Surveillance Video Enhancement
- Conclusions




Smoking is not good for health

Security and Privacy Challenges: Secure Storage over Cloud



Encryption techniques – Watermarking – Secret sharing



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Security and Privacy Challenges: Insecure Processing over Cloud





Image Zooming and Cropping
on Original Data



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Security and Privacy Challenges: Secure Processing over Cloud

Still to be addressed




Image Zooming and Cropping
on Encrypted Data

Our Objective: Secure Cloud-based Multimedia Processing

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Privacy



Smoking is not
good for health

Our Objective: Secure Cloud-based Multimedia Processing

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Privacy
- Computational Efficiency
- Bandwidth Efficiency
- High Quality Image



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good for health

Technical Challenges

- Finding a Cryptosystem
 - Fully homomorphic cryptosystem is not practical
$$E(A) + E(B) = E(A+B)$$
 - Somewhat homomorphic cryptosystem cannot hide all information

Technical Challenges

- Finding a Cryptosystem
 - Fully homomorphic cryptosystem is not practical
$$E(A) + E(B) = E(A+B)$$
 - Somewhat homomorphic cryptosystem cannot hide all information
- Using Real Numbers in a Cryptosystem
 - Modular prime operation of a cryptosystem is not compatible with real number operations of a data/image processing algorithm



Rest of the talk

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Finding a Cryptosystem

- Key Observations
 - Shamir's (k,n) Secret Sharing (SSS) or (l,k,n) Multi-Secret Sharing (MSS) can be used as principal cryptosystem
 - Other cryptosystems can be used to support operations that are not supported by SSS and MSS




Finding a Cryptosystem

- Review of (k, n) SSS

Sharing a Secret

$$F(x) = \left(\underset{\substack{\downarrow \\ \text{Secret}}}{S} + \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} \underset{\substack{\downarrow \\ \text{Random} \\ \text{Number}}}{a_i} x^i \right) \underset{\substack{\downarrow \\ \text{Prime} \\ \text{Number}}}{\text{mod } q}$$



Breaking the secret into n shares

Finding a Cryptosystem


- Review of (k, n) SSS

Reconstructing a Secret

$$L(x) = \left(\sum_{i=0}^{k-1} F(i) t_i(x) \right) \bmod q$$

\swarrow i^{th} Share \searrow

$$\prod_{j=0, j \neq i}^{k-1} \frac{x - x_j}{x_i - x_j}$$



Reconstructing the secret using $k \leq n$ shares

Finding a Cryptosystem

- Review of (l, k, n) MSS

Sharing a Secret

$$F(x) = \left(\sum_{i=0}^{l-1} s_i x^i + \sum_{i=l}^{k-1} a_i x^i \right) \text{ mod } q$$


 i^{th} Secret

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Using Real Numbers in a Cryptosystem

- Excluding Modular Prime Operation from the Cryptosystem

- Example: Shamir's secret sharing

$$F(x) = S + \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} a_i x^i$$

- Side Effect: Degradation of Security

- ✓ For $(2, n)$ Shamir's secret sharing, the probability of finding the secret from $F(x_i)$ is:

- With mod q : $1/q$

- Without mod q : $INT(x_i / F(x_i))$

Using Real Numbers in a Cryptosystem

- Modifying Real number to an Integer

$$- R(S,d) = \text{round}(S,d) \times 10^d$$



Integer
Representative



Obtained by rounding
off S by d decimal
places

Using Real Numbers in a Cryptosystem

- Modifying Real number to an Integer

$$- R(S,d) = \text{round}(S,d) \times 10^d$$



Integer
Representative



Obtained by rounding
off S by d decimal
places

- Side Effect: Roundoff Error

- ✓ Is bounded by $\pm (5 \times 10^{-(d+1)})$

- ✓ Expands with addition and scalar multiplication



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
Secure Cloud-based Image Scaling/Cropping

- Why scaling/cropping in data centers?
 - Streaming a large image
 - Downloading a large image (e.g. histopathology image that can be 40 GB in size 80000×80000 in dimension) is not feasible
 - Previewing an image before viewing
- Why dynamic scaling/cropping on shadow (or hidden) images?
 - Pre-cropping required additional data to be sent
 - Pre-scaling cannot ensure step-less zooming

M. Mohanty, W.-T. Ooi and P. K. Atrey. [Scale me, crop me, know me not: Supporting scaling and cropping in secret image sharing](#). *IEEE International Conference on Multimedia and Expo (ICME'2013)*, July 15-19, 2013, San Jose, CA, USA.

Secure Cloud-based Image Scaling/Cropping

- Architecture and Workflow



Secure Cloud-based Image Scaling/Cropping

- Proposed Secret Image Sharing Scheme
 - Inter-pixel correlation is hidden by using a set of random numbers as coefficient in the secret sharing polynomial
 - $(3,k,n)$ MSS

$$H(x) = \left(R + Gx + Bx^2 + \sum_{i=3}^{k-1} a_i x^i \right) \text{ mod } q$$


Secure Cloud-based Image Scaling/Cropping

- Experiments



- Server, datacenters, and user are simulated in a PC
- Two test images
 - ✓ A histopathology image (size 5.2 MB, dimension: 2756 × 3663)
 - ✓ The *Lena* Image (size 205.5 KB, dimension: 512 × 512)

Secure Cloud-based Image Scaling/Cropping



- Results: Scaling



Required





Zoomed Shadow
Image





Recovered Zoomed
Image

Secure Cloud-based Image Scaling/Cropping



- Results: Cropping



Required



Cropped Shadow
Image



Recovered Cropped
Image

Secure Cloud-based Image Scaling/Cropping




- Security Analysis
 - Confidentiality
 - ✓ Perceptual security
 - ✓ Multi-secret sharing is not perfectly secure

Secure Cloud-based Image Scaling/Cropping

- Security Analysis

– Integrity

✓ if $n > k$, then ${}^n C_k$ ways to reconstruct an image



Corrupted shadow image(s) implies different reconstructed images

Secure Cloud-based Image Scaling/Cropping

- Performance Analysis

- Data Overhead

- ✓ $\frac{bk-24}{24}$ times more than the conventional streaming,
where b is the number of bits required to represent q
 - ✓ For $d = 2$ and $k = 4$, 1.5 times more than the
conventional

- Computational Overhead

- ✓ For a PC with Intel Core 2 Quad 2.83 Ghz processor and
4GB of RAM, approximately 76.35 ms is required to
recover a 512×512 secret image ($0.3 \mu s$ per pixel)




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Secure Cloud-based

Pre-classification Volume Ray-casting


- Architecture and Workflow



M. Mohanty, P. K. Atrey and W.-T. Ooi. [Secure cloud-based medical data visualization](#). *The ACM International Conference on Multimedia (ACMMM'12)*, October 29-November 2, 2012, Nara, Japan.


Secure Cloud-based Pre-classification Volume Ray-casting

- Review: Pre-classification Volume Ray-casting




Secure Cloud-based Pre-classification Volume Ray-casting

- Review: Pre-classification Volume Ray-casting




Secure Cloud-based Pre-classification Volume Ray-casting

- Review: Pre-classification Volume Ray-casting




Secure Cloud-based Pre-classification Volume Ray-casting

- Securing Post Ray-projection
 - Hiding computation on colors



Original



Hidden Color

Not hiding computation on opacities





Secure Cloud-based Pre-classification Volume Ray-casting

- Experiment
 - Server, Datacenters, and Client are simulated in a PC
 - Customized VTK 5.8.0
 - ✓ Pre-classification volume ray-casting
 - ✓ Integrated (3,5) Secret Sharing

Secure Cloud-based Pre-classification Volume Ray-casting


- Data Set

	Dimension	Size
Head	256 X 256 X 124	7.8 MB
Foot	256 X 256 X 256	16 MB
Iron port	68 X 68 X 68	307.3 KB
Bucky	32 x 32 X 32	32.2 KB




Secure Cloud-based Pre-classification Volume Ray-casting

- Results: Single View Point




Secure Cloud-based Pre-classification Volume Ray-casting

- Results: Single View Point



Secure Cloud-based Pre-classification Volume Ray-casting

- Results: Multiple View Point



Secure Cloud-based Pre-classification Volume Ray-casting

Head MRI volume data


*Rendered Image
(Secret Image)
Conventional Server-
Side Rendering*

*Share Image
Rendered in a Data
Center
Cloud-based Secure
Rendering*

*Image Reconstructed
at Client*

Foot volume data

*Rendered Image
(Secret Image)
Conventional Server-
Side Rendering*






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Encrypted-domain Video Quality Enhancement over Cloud


- Architecture and Workflow



A. Lathey, P. K. Atrey and N. Joshi. [Homomorphic low pass filtering on encrypted multimedia over cloud](#). *IEEE International Conference on Semantic Computing (ICSC'2013)*, September 2013, Irvine, CA, USA.


THE PROBLEM:

Non-terminating averaged value




SOLUTION BASED ON PREVIOUS METHOD

Multiply each pixel intensity value by a factor of 10^d , where d depends upon the precision of the desired decimal digits up to which we want to process the real numbers. The prime number should always be chosen as greater than $(255+51 \times 10^d) \times 10^d$




APPLIED TO THE PROBLEM:



PROPOSED SOLUTION:

pre-process the image data in such a way that averaging is performed on completely divisible values only.



Encrypted-domain Video Quality Enhancement over Cloud

Scheme I: Multiplying each original intensity value by the mask size, $(m \times n)$. In other words, convert each pixel $I(u, v)$ to a multiple of $(m \times n)$ by,


$$I'(u, v) = I(u, v) \times (m \times n)$$

Scheme II: Changing each original intensity value to the nearest multiple of $(m \times n)$ by adding or subtracting a maximum of values to or from its current value, where the range of lies between 1 and $\Gamma m \cdot n / 2$. In other words, convert each pixel $I(u, v)$ to a multiple of $(m \times n)$ by,

$$I'(u, v) = I(u, v) \pm \Delta$$

Encrypted-domain Video Quality Enhancement over Cloud

- Results – Scheme 1



```
function
% all
% This script takes up the image sequence
Folder = fullfile('...', 'image', 'sequence', 'original');
input = dir(fullfile(Folder, '*.avi'));
Name = (dirOutput.name)';
Name = name2file(Name);

p = imread(input);
imshow(input(p));
subplot(2,1);

% allocate the array
seq = zeros(1, size(p, 2), size(p, 3));
seq(1, :, :) = p;


sequence = imfilter(sequence, ones(3, 3)/3);
seq = seq;
% results
subplot(2,3,1); imshow(sequence(1,:), p);
title(sprintf('original image %d %d', p));
% seq
subplot(2,3,2); imshow(sequence(1,:), seq);
title(sprintf('image image %d %d', p));
subplot(2,3,3); imshow(sequence(1,:), p);
title(sprintf('image image %d %d', p));
subplot(2,3,4); imshow(seq);
title(sprintf('image image %d %d', p));
subplot(2,3,5); imshow(sequence(1,:), p);
title(sprintf('image image %d %d', p));
subplot(2,3,6); imshow(sequence(1,:), seq);
title(sprintf('image image %d %d', p));

end
```

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hJg67v3IbmU&feature=youtu.be>

Encrypted-domain Video Quality Enhancement over Cloud

- Results – Scheme 2



The screenshot shows a video player interface with a control bar at the top. Below the video frame, there is a large block of code overlaid on the video. The code is in C++ and appears to be related to video processing, specifically handling frames and pixel data. The code includes comments and function calls like `uint8_t`, `uint16_t`, and `uint32_t`. The code is partially obscured by the video player's control bar and the video frame itself.

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TqRHJ6KrZY0&feature=youtu.be>



Conclusions

- Addressed incompatibility of a cryptosystem with real number
- Proposed three frameworks using Shamir's secret sharing as principal cryptosystem
- More secure cloud-based systems can be built using somewhat homomorphic cryptosystems

Publications

- A. Lathey, P. K. Atrey and N. Joshi. **Homomorphic low pass filtering on encrypted multimedia over cloud**. *IEEE International Conference on Semantic Computing (ICSC'2013)*, September 2013, Irvine, CA, USA.
- M. Mohanty, W.-T. Ooi and P. K. Atrey. **Scale me, crop me, know me not: Supporting scaling and cropping in secret image sharing**. *IEEE International Conference on Multimedia and Expo (ICME'2013)*, July 15-19, 2013, San Jose, CA, USA.
- M. Mohanty, P. K. Atrey and W.-T. Ooi. **Secure cloud-based medical data visualization**. *The ACM International Conference on Multimedia (ACMMM'12)*, October 29-November 2, 2012, Nara, Japan.

What Next?

- This is not the end of the world.
- Need to examine the suitability of the proposed frameworks in other cloud-based applications such as:
 - Scaling/cropping on compressed images/videos
 - Compression in encrypted domain
 - Processing other media e.g. text documents and audio